Application to be no longer subject to the notification requirements
under the Sex Offenders Law
[2019]JRC223
Royal Court
(Samedi)
11 November 2019
Before :
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J. A. Clyde-Smith O. B. E., Commissioner,
and Jurats Crill and Olsen
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Between
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L
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Applicant
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And
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The Attorney General
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Respondent
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IN THE MATTER OF L
AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION
UNDER ARTICLE 5(5) OF THE SEX OFFENDERS (JERSEY) LAW 2010
Advocate A. M. Harrison for the Applicant
R. P. Pedley Esq., Crown Advocate for the
Respondent.
JUDGMENT
THE COMMISSIONER:
1.
The
Applicant applies that he no longer be subject to the notification requirements
under the Sex Offenders (Jersey) Law 2010 (“the Sex Offenders
Law”). The Applicant was made
subject to those requirements following his conviction more than five years ago
for making or attempting to make indecent photographs of children.
2.
When he
was sentenced, the Court determined that five years should expire before he
could apply to have the notification requirements lifted. The Court also imposed restraining orders
for a period of five years and those orders have now lapsed. The Applicant is
now in his fifties.
3.
The
application is brought under Article 5(5) of the Sex Offenders Law, and the
test to be applied is set out in Article 5(6), which is in the following
terms:-
“(6) The court must not make the order applied
for under paragraph (5) unless it is satisfied that the risk of sexual harm to
the public, or to any particular person or persons, that the person subject to
the notification requirements of this Law poses by virtue of the likelihood of
re-offending does not justify the person’s being subject to those
requirements.”
4.
The
notification requirement scheme amounts to a legitimate interference with the
private life of those subject to it, within the scope of Article 8(1) of the
European Convention on Human Rights, but as the Court said at paragraph 12 of AG
v Roberts [2011] JLR 125:-
“….it nonetheless
remains necessary for the court to satisfy itself that the orders which it
makes are proportionate so that the extent of the interference with the
convention right is balanced appropriately against the important public
interest which is the basis of the legislation.”
5.
As the
Court concluded in AG v Roberts at paragraph 23, an applicant has to
satisfy the Court to the civil standard:-
“… that the risk of his
or her committing further sexual offending can be discounted to the extent that
the imposition of the notification requirements is unjustified. The facts on which the offender would
rely for such a contention will be too diverse for summary, but the seriousness
of the original offence, the length of time since the offending and special
circumstances, if any, which led to the offending and which no longer exist,
might all potentially be relevant.
The Court would expect to have all background reports at the time the
offending took place, and in most cases an update on those reports to highlight
material changes in the interval.”
6.
If the
Court refuses to lift the notification requirements, then under Article 5(7) it
must make an order specifying a further period before another application may
be applied for.
Hearing in private
7.
As in all
of these cases, the Applicant sought an order that the hearing be in private
or, if not, that any judgment be anonymised. The principles to be applied in such an
application are to be found in the case of Jersey Evening Post Limited v Al
Thani and Four Others [2002] JLR 542, where it was held, quoting from the
headnote:-
“(2) The principle of open justice had not yet
found statutory expression in Jersey but formed part of the law and an order
for proceedings to be heard in camera was only to be granted when it was
necessary to do justice in the exceptional circumstances of the case, e.g. to
protect specific individuals or prevent the destruction of the subject-matter
in issue. Public proceedings
ordinarily deterred inappropriate behaviour on the part of the court,
maintained public confidence in the impartial administration of justice, made
uninformed and inaccurate comment on the proceedings less likely, and could
result in additional evidence becoming available. The burden lay with the party seeking an
order for hearing in camera to prove that it was the only way in which justice
could be done; convenience, potential embarrassment and parties’
preferences were in themselves insufficient justification (paras.
12-17).”
8.
Examples
of exceptional circumstances which might justify sitting in private were
mentioned in AG v Roberts in relation to applications under Article
30(2) of the Sex Offenders Law which could also apply to applications under
Article 5(5):-
“43……..It is
pointed out that there may have been a change in circumstances since the date
of the conviction – the offender may have married, and the existence of
the previous conviction may be unknown to his or her spouse and/or children. It is possible that the effect of
further publicity would lead the offender to the view that he or she could not
escape the consequences of the previous offending which might therefore be a
disinhibiting factor to further offending. It is said that there may be circumstances
where the publicity given to the application might be an extremely negative
factor in the context of the work being done with the offender by the probation
services. This is not necessarily
an exclusive list of objections, but these examples are provided as
illustrations of the kind of case where the courts might consider the interests
of the offender outweighed the public interest that the court should sit in
public, or that the court’s judgment should be pronounced publicly and
without anonymizing the offender.”
9.
As the
Court in Jersey Evening Post Limited v Al Thani concluded at paragraph
16:-
“The aim therefore was to do justice to the parties before the
Court. That aim must not be
stultified by a rigid application of the principle that justice must be done in
public. Yet the principle of open
justice should not be displaced as a matter of convenience or expedience, or to
avoid embarrassment to one or more of the parties, but only if it is necessary
to do so in the interests of justice.”
10. Publicity accompanying the Applicant’s
conviction created difficulties for himself and his wife.
11. The Attorney General accepts that publicity
about this case now could inflame passions again and recognised, in particular,
the impact of this upon the Applicant’s wife, who is an innocent
party. The Attorney General was not
therefore firmly opposed to the Court sitting in private.
12. The purpose of the Sex Offenders Law is to
protect potential victims from sexual harm, and not to further penalise the
offender, by ensuring that the police are aware of the whereabouts of all
serious sex offenders, knowledge which is of obvious assistance in the
detection of offenders and the prevention of crime (see paragraph 25 of AG v
Roberts). Knowledge that a
person is registered with the police may also dissuade him or her from
committing further offences, and thus the measures contribute towards a lower
rate of re-offending in sex offenders (see paragraph 14 of AG v Roberts).
13. It is no part of the scheme to encourage
vigilantism through publicity of applications of this kind, putting the safety
of the Applicant and in particular innocent parties at risk; indeed, that would
increase the burden upon the paid and honorary police, who have already
deployed resources at the time of the Applicant’s conviction in regular
patrols of the area in which the Applicant’s wife lives. It also seems to
the Court that in a small community such as Jersey, the potential for
vigilantism is greater than otherwise might be the case.
14. For these reasons, the Court agreed to sit in
private, but it accepts that there is a legitimate interest in the public and
the legal profession knowing how applications of this kind are treated by the
Court, and therefore, this judgment will be issued in an anonymised form.
The application
15. The Applicant is described as leading a lonely
secluded life. He has numerous
health concerns, including depression and anxiety to name but two, for which he
has been prescribed an extensive number of tablets daily. He has two earlier convictions for sexual
offences, both of which resulted in short prison sentences and both of which he
denies. He has been unemployed for over 20 years.
16. The Applicant made it clear from the outset
that he was not going to undergo any sexual offending treatment, whether in
prison or on his release. His
claimed rationale for engaging in looking at indecent images of children was to
identify victims of abuse. He
denied any sexual gratification from his sexual offending and stated that the
sexual abuse of children “disgusts
him”.
17. However following his release, he has attended
regularly with his probation officer, Ms Janette Urquhart, and whilst he would
not discuss his sexual convictions with her, she says he has shown insight into
the detrimental and potential long-lasting consequences of sexual abuse for
victims (he would place himself in this category). He engaged well with Ms Urquhart, and
the indications are that he has been fully compliant with the restraining
orders when they were in place and there has been no recurrence of sexualised
behaviours.
18. His devices have been checked during home
visits and nothing of a concerning nature was revealed. According to the police report, he had
accessed adult pornography on his laptop but Advocate Harrison informed the
Court, on instructions, that the Applicant denied viewing any adult
pornography.
19. Advocate Harrison submitted that there were a
number of factors in the case which could justify the conclusion that the risk
of sexual harm posed by the Applicant does not justify his being subject to the
notification requirements:-
(i)
In the
view of Ms Urquhart, the Applicant is towards the low end of the moderate band
of sexual recidivism.
(ii) He has the ongoing support of his wife.
(iii) He has a number of health concerns which have
affected his libido.
(iv) Under the SAS07 Stable Assessment, he scored
primarily in “significant social influences”, “capacity for
relationship stability”, “general social rejection” and
“negative emotionality”.
In Advocate Harrison’s view, there was a degree of overlap in the
justification for scoring in each area, and the reasons for the scores were, to
some extent, a result of his offending and the consequences rather than the
cause.
(v) The De-Notification Report records the
Applicant as saying that lifting the reporting requirements would enable him to
start moving on with his life without trying to live under the label of
“sex offender”.
Advocate Harrison argued that lifting the restrictions may, in the
particular circumstances of this case, serve to reduce the risk still further.
20. Crown Advocate Pedley, for the Attorney
General, opposed the application for the following reasons:-
(i)
The SA07
Stable Assessment placed him in the middle of the moderate range for sexual
recidivism.
(ii) He remains in denial as to the nature of the
offences and justifies his possession of the images by saying he was looking
for images of himself.
(iii) He has done limited work whilst in custody and
refused any sexual offending treatment.
He is therefore an untreated sex offender.
Decision
21. After some deliberation, the Court has decided
that it cannot make an order under Article 5(5) of the Sex Offenders Law
lifting the notification requirements for the following reasons:-
(i)
The
offences are serious. The images
were downloaded over a lengthy period of time, using sophisticated practices to
do so. Of the images found, more
than a third were of severe sexual abuse of children involving sexual
intercourse between children and adults.
(ii) He has maintained from the outset that there
was no sexual element to his offending and has refused any sexual offending
treatment whilst in prison. Whilst
making some progress after his release with Ms Urquhart, he has refused to
discuss his convictions and sexual behaviours with her. He is, therefore, an untreated offender
in denial, a denial that extends back to the two earlier contact sexual
offences.
(iii) Whilst Ms Urquhart has placed him within the
lower end of the moderate band for sexual recidivism, as against the SA07
Stable Assessment which placed him in the middle of the moderate band, he is
still within the moderate band for sexual recidivism.
(iv) The Court is concerned with the risk of sexual
harm, and in the context of this case, principally with the risk of his
accessing indecent images of children again. His continued denial of any sexual
interest in them, a denial which in itself suggests that his interest may
remain, combined with the very isolated lifestyle he leads is of concern, as is
his denial of accessing the adult pornography found on his laptop.
22. In our view the risk of further sexual
offending cannot be discounted to the extent that the notification requirements
are no longer justified. We
therefore refuse the application and pursuant to Article 5(7), we order that a
further two years must expire before a further application can be made to lift
the notification requirements.
Authorities
Sex Offenders (Jersey) Law 2010.
AG
v Roberts [2011] JLR 125.
Jersey
Evening Post Limited v Al Thani and Four Others [2002] JLR 542